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The economic crisis of 2008-2010, which has hit the world, especially the Baltic States with 
their ultraliberal economy, has forced Estonia to lo k for solutions to overcome the depression. 
A low level of taxation, the policy of “thin state policy” and small public sector have influenced 
the macroeconomics of Estonia since it re-independence. The indirect taxes, especially 
consumption taxes, are dominating in Estonian taxation system.  
The increase in the tax burden of a little more than 2% in 2009, through the increase VAT and 
excises, and through the pruning of income taxation be efits, did not enlarge the state budget in 
the same amount. The pruning of the budget not only rapidly decreased the internal market of 
the state, but also decreased incomes in future periods due to the dominance of consumption 
taxes. The economic depression, which began in 2008has demonstrated a weak orientation of 
Estonian economy, threaten its taxation system on innovation. The author considers the reason 
of it to be in a big percentage of consumption taxes in Estonian state budget. The amount of 
investments has essentially decreased than the decrase of GDP and state budget.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper does not deal with the direct role of the state in the innovation process. We are trying 
to observe influence of some aspects of the Estonian taxation system on private entrepreneurship and 
respectively on innovation. The Republic of Estonia has driven the policy of a “lean state”. This is why 
costs in most fields, among them scientific research and especially R&D have been low and the role of 
entrepreneurship in innovation processes has been important. 
Any kind of entrepreneurship needs a specific environment for its development. Environments 
can be of different kinds: social, economic, technological, ecological, legal and so on. A positive 
cumulative effect of all these environments is needed in order to obtain maximal results, whereas 
deviation by any of them may induce conspicuous consequences for entrepreneurship. 
Nations are interested in developing their economies. After the demise of the centrally planned 
economy, all the newly independent countries have become interested in an economic environment that 
supports entrepreneurship. At the same time, it is qu te difficult to change many of the components of the 
entrepreneurial environment, especially in the short run. Economic policies try to coordinate some of the
most important changes in the components of the economic environment. As entrepreneurship has the 
purpose of generating profit, thus it is very important to regard the profit margin as a guiding force in 
entrepreneurship (Mises, 2000, 13). 
Estonian experiment with the virtual lifting of corporate income tax since January 2000 sought to 
create additional resources for investments in the private sector. As the money was left for the enterprises 
without any limits, so a question arose: if the money was used for investments, were they made in Estonia 
and were the investments innovative?  
The economic crisis, which has lasted 2007-2010, has decreased GDP by more than 20% and 
essentially decreased the state budget (in spite of he raising of taxes), and posed a question about the 
efficiency of the Estonian state budget and its correspondence with modern demands. Certainly, tax as the 
most important source of state budget income is a question of special interest. As the tax funds of the last 
two years demonstrate, the current taxation system has not been able to ensure the stability of budget 
incomes despite the raising of taxes. In explaining the severe decrease in the state budget, we could ask 
what role the economic crisis and the specificity of the Estonian taxation system had played. Particularly, 
what have been the impacts of the tax burden, taxation s ructure, payment order etc. (the economic policy 
of government), especially budget paring, on an essential decrease in tax funds?  
Let’s observe only one question of this complicated complex of questions. How has the decrease 
in the incomes of Estonian state budget taken place; and what connection exists between this process, the 
theoretical indirect taxes model and the Estonian taxation system, especially with the structural specificity 
of taxes? The second problem considered is the influe ce of budget paring on eventual tax funds. It is
obvious that if the budget income, which is anyhow small, were to decrease, then there would be a brake 
on the state’s capacity to support innovation. Direct investments and state support for R&D would be 
decreased.  
A special model for the research was not constructed by the author. The most wide-spread 
methods of economic research have been used in the paper – comparison, analysis tables and observation 
of dynamics; these methods proved to be effective in current situation. The data are given in euro. The
official rating of EEK to euro before 2011 was 15.646  all the time.   
 
1.1.Estonian taxation structure  
Before joining the European Union (EU) and from its beginning in 1993, the characteristic 
features of Estonian tax system have been a relativy low tax burden, simplicity bordering on 
primitiveness (which has significantly reduced the possibilities of using taxes as a control device in the 
economy) and a very high percentage of indirect and consumption taxes. 
The tax burden in Estonia has been 33.7–35.1% since Estonia joined the EU (Estonian ministry 
of finance website http://www.fin.ee/). The tax burden ought to increase to 36% as a result of taxation 
rises in response to the economic crisis in 2010 (ibid). It is lower than the EU average (40–41%). 
However, these numbers are not comparable. The Estonian state budget includes social benefits tax, 
which has for many years been the greatest source of income for the state budget (Table 1). In most EU 
Member States such a tax does not exist or is slight.  
A principal change was introduced in the tax system on 1 January 2000: corporate income tax 
was lifted in Estonia. The idea of using low taxes to attract foreign investments is not new; all offshore 
systems are based on this. Nor is it a new idea that profits ploughed into real assets will increase th  value 
of these assets, thus enabling the assets to reproduce themselves. The lack of internal accumulation 
accrued in all transition countries, which did not merely constrain enterprise innovation, but became even 
worse at simple reproduction. Yet, theoretical arguments by both authors of the reform and those applying 
the reform ideas in Estonia are open to challenge. 
Lifting the corporate income tax in Estonia can be regarded as an experiment which turned the 
notion of the “object of taxation” upside down. It has become a common concept that entire profit be 
subject to taxation, only certain ways of using profit (for example payment of dividends, specific benefits, 
etc.) have been made objects of taxation. As such, the law should provide an exhaustive list of ways of 
using profit subject to taxation, instead of barely mentioning the tax incentives. However, no list can be 
entirely exhaustive. Consequently, opportunities for tax fraud present themselves here, all the more s 
because quite often virtually the same payments can go by different names.  
Estonian taxation practice differs from that of many countries also in the timing of the creation 
of tax liability. According to general practice in many jurisdictions, corporate income tax liability arises 
instantaneously as the profit amount has been confirmed. Possible delays can be caused only by verifying 
accounting statements or by settling accounts. Under Estonian law, however, the profit earned can remain 
intact on the companies’ bank accounts for years as it is not subject to taxation unless being used for out-
payments.  
Savings are a natural source of investments. In the transition period for states with small GDP 
and most households being unable to satisfy their primary needs, savings make up a small percentage of 
GDP. In 1998, domestic savings in Estonia were about 20.3% of GDP, at the same time domestic 
investments made up 16% of GDP (Eesti Panga Bülletään, 2003, 1 p.7). Obviously, the difference is due 
to certain historical characteristics inherent in the states undergoing transition in the second half of the 
20th Century. The demand that had not been satisfied for decades and was typical of the communist 
system before its collapse could be satisfied now and households have used their money to consume it not
for investments. The information below explicitly indicates a relatively low level of domestic 
investments, and more particularly, their small total amount. Investments are one of the most important 
inputs for production, and their scarcity in a certain period is an extremely. The Estonian Institute of 
Economic Research has sampled that the insufficiency of investments was in first place among the factors 
that broke the economy in 1993–1996.  
It is very difficult to find a connection between the lifting of corporate income tax and levels of 
foreign direct investments (FDI). The expansion rate of GDP depends on the economic cycle more than 
on FDI. The influences of other factors such as busines  expectations and the niche for international 
companies in the Estonian market have been greater than the impact from lifting corporate income tax. 
Certainly, a question will arise: why have the foreign direct investments into Estonia remained 
below the level expected? First, the most profitable fields of economy in Estonia had been acquired by 
foreign owners already before 2000. Secondly, it should not be forgotten that the rate of income tax is just 
one of the factors by which investors choose the place their investments. Thirdly, the competitive ability 
of Estonia and Eastern Europe in engaging foreign investors has not been dealt with. In 2002 the 
corporate income tax for the EU-25 was 2.4% of GDP (Maggiulli, 2004, p17-18). The Estonian figure of 
1.7% is not sufficiently different from this average to be an effective incentive. Moreover, this figure was 
still smaller in Latvia, Lithuania and Croatia. In Estonia and Slovenia the corporate income tax indicators 
were almost identical. Estonia is not much more attrac ive with its investment taxation policies. 
Moreover, many states such as Croatia, Lithuania and Slovakia, where special benefits are not taxed, are 
not less attractive for investors in terms of profit taxation. 
Table 1. Income from taxes in Estonian state budget 2005–2012 (million euro). 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations (Estonian Ministry ofFinance website http://www.fin.ee/budgeting/; 
Eurostat. Taxation http://epp.eurostat.ee.europa.eu/portal/page?-pageid/)  
 
 
As for innovation, a certain aspect should be stresed – because the Estonian taxation system allows 
enterprises to keep their profit without taxation fr an unlimited time, the enterprises do not have a strong 
incentive to spend the money quickly or for innovative purposes (Eesti Vabariigi…, 2008 p.188; Eesti 
Vabariigi…, 2009, p. 93). 
Table 1 presents taxes in the Estonian state budget from 2005; that is, after Estonia joined the EU. It is difficult to 
assess the percentage of indirect taxes in the Estonian state budget. Indirect taxes clearly include VAT, excises and 
the customs tax. The percentage of indirect taxes has been 53.6%. It is one of the highest percentages of indirect taxes 
among EU member states. 
The figures demonstrate a growing dominance of social taxes in Estonian state budget tax funds 
from 34.2% in 2005 to 44.4% in 2008 (44.0% in 2009). The crisis, which began in 2008, froze the sums 
paid as wages in 2009 due to unemployment and led to the decrease in social taxes. It dented the state
budget of Estonia and essentially cut the size of the budget for 2010. Clearly budget incomes, which are 
based on consumption taxes, have great elasticity during periods when incomes and consumption are 
rapidly growing, but a system of this kind has a low floatage (Table 1). 
The figures in Table 2 demonstrate once again that the tax funds react to GDP changes with 
some lag time. The peculiarity of the state budget of the Republic of Estonia – a great proportion of which 
is consumption taxes – produces a pattern whereby the tax funds are in correlation with the dynamics of 
wages (especially in 2008) rather than the dynamics of GDP. A smaller decrease in tax funds in 
comparison with GDP in 2009 has occurred from the growth of the turnover taxes rate by 2 percentage 
points, the increase of excises and the pruning of income tax benefits. The concrete influence of rising 





Total taxes 3440 3528 4328 4499 4076 4046 4341 4775 
Personal income tax 697 246 306 277 155 192 209 266 
Corporate income tax 152 200 261 266 255 194 201 252 
VAT 896 1192 1425 1313 1202 1248 1339 1494 
Excises 411 449 524 574 627 666 717 776 
  excise on tobacco 77 77 98 119 133 115 153 158 
  excise on alcohol 117 133 148 155 166 165 198 195 
  excise on fuel 215 238 278 300 311 311 355 390 
  excise on packaging … 1 … … … …. … …. 
Gambling tax 19 16 30 31 18 21 22 20 
Customs tax 22 17 35 32 20 24 29 29 
Social benefits tax 1175 1390 1743 2000 1795 1698 1801 1933 
Other taxes 68 3 4 6 4 4 23 15 
Table 2. Dynamics of tax funds, wages, unemployment and GDP 2007–2012 (as a percentage in 
comparison with the same quarter of the last year). 
 
Period 2007       2008       
  I II III IV I II III IV 
GDP 9.8 7.6 6.4 4.5 0.4 -1.4 -3.3 -9.9 
Tax revenues 27.6 28.4 18.6 18.2 10.2 5.7 7.1 -2.8 
Average wage 20.1 21.2 1.,9 20.2 19.5 15.2 14.4 6.9 
Unemployment (%) 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.0 6.2 7.6 
Period 2009    2010    
  I II III IV I I I III IV 
GDP -15.1 -16.5 -15.6 -9.7 -2.4 1.7 3.1 6.2 
Tax revenues -10.1 -12.1 -13.6 -10.9 5.7 -2.2 -1.0 2.2 
Average wage -1.5 -4.4 -5.9 -4.9 -2.3 -1.7 -0.7 3.9 
Unemployment (%) 11.4 13.5 14.4 15.5 19.8 18.6 15.5 13.6 
Period 2011    2012    
 I II III IV   I II III IV 
GDP 11.4 12.7 9.8 4.0  3.4 3.5 3.4 3.7 
Tax revenues 1.6 9.8 5.9 3.9 11.2 11.0 11.6 10.6 
Average wage 4.4 4.2 6.5 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.9 
Unemployment (%) 11.4 12.7 9.8 11.0 10.9 10.1 10.0 9.9 
 




1.2. Economic depression and the Estonian state budget 
In some Eastern European states the economic depression 2008-2011 turned into a severe crisis 
which could be compared with the Great Depression of 1929–1932, especially in Estonia. Discussion of 
all these reasons is beyond the scope of this paper. But its range and course of crises 2008-2011 have 
been very different. As the crisis began in financil sector, so the states, wherein the income from the 
financial sector formed the greatest part of the GDP, suffered first of all. Due to urgent and powerful 
measures taken by these states the situation has been stabilized at this point.       
            
 
Table 3. Indirect taxes in Estonian state budget 2005–2012. (million euro) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total taxes 3528 4328 4499 4076 4046 4341 4775 
Indirect taxes (social benefits tax 
included)  
3084 3759 3953 3645 56923 3878 4230 
Percentage of indirect taxes (%, 
social benefits tax included) 
87.4 86.9 87.8 89.5 89.9 89.3 88,6 
Indirect taxes (social benefits tax not 
included)  
1694 2016 1953 1867 30351 2077 2297 
 
 
Source: the author’s calculations (data from table 1) 
 
The state budgets have found themselves in an especially severe situation. The crisis, which 
began in 2008, frozened the sums paid as wages in 2009 due to the unemployment and it led to the 
decrease of social taxes. It beat the state budget of the Republic of Estonia and essentially cut the amount 
of budget of 2010. Obviously, the incomes of budget, which base on consuming taxes, have got a great 
elasticity during the periods, wherein the incomes and consumption are rapidly growing, but a system of 
this kind has got a low floatage. (Table 3).  
The figures of Table 3 demonstrate once again that the ax funds react on GDP hangs with some 
lag time. The peculiarity of the state budget of the Republic of Estonia – a great proportion of 
consumption taxes – brings a peculiar fact: the tax funds are in correlation with the dynamics of wages 
(especially in 2008) rather than the dynamics of GDP. The consumption taxes in table 3 have been given 
in two different ways: with social tax and without it. Namely, Estonia has got a unique social tax, which 
forms up to 33% of the sum of paid wages and which therefore has been treated as consumption tax of 
labour force by several authors. The relative importance of consumption taxes in Estonian budget is very
big no matter if the tax is considered to be consumption tax (approach, which could be debatable) or not 
(Raju, 2013, pp.137-139). A smaller decrease of tax funds in comparison with the GDP ones in 2009 has 
diversely been occurred from the lifting of tax burden (the growth of turnover taxes rate by 2 percentage 
points, the increase of excises, and the decrease of income tax benefits). The concrete influence of taxes 
lifting and the influence of prices elasticity on tax funds can’t be explained here. 
People divide their available income into two: savings and consumption. The proportion of the 
average saving per person was 7.9% from available income in 2008; in 2009 it was 9.2%. The rest of 
available income was spent on consumption.  
It is possible to calculate the proportions of decreased tax income caused by the negative supplementary 
budgets of 2008 and 2009 according to the tax rates, proportion of savings and employment expenses 
mentioned above.  
The first negative supplementary state balance was accepted on the 19th June 2008. The amount 
of the first state balance – 5.980.827 thousand euro, was decreased by 205 174 thousand euro (3.4%). 
Even two negative supplementary state balances were accepted in 2009. In the first, expenses were cut by 
420 269 thousand euro (6.3%) and in the second they were cut by 163 835 thousand euro (2.4%). 
The tax income was reduced as a result of the negativ  state balances by 49095 thousand euro in 
2008, and in 2009 at first by 234955 thousand followed by another 66224 thousand euro, a total of 
301179 thousand euro in 2009. Accordingly, the decrease in returning income due to the different 
structure of cuts was 23.9% in 2008 and due to the negative supplementary state budgets, 32.1% and 40.4 
% in 2009. The wages fund, which has the highest percentage of returning income, was especially cut in 
the last supplementary budget (Eesti Vabariigi…, 2008, p. 188; Eesti Vabariigi…, 2009, p.93; Eesti 
Vabariigi… 2010, p.233)  
Percentage of indirect taxes (%, 
social benefits tax not included) 
48,0 46.6 43.4  45.8 47.9 47.8 48.1 
Consumption taxes, social benefits 
tax included  
3084 3759 3953 3645 56891 3857 4230 
Percentage of consumption taxes (%, 
social benefits tax included) 
87.4 86.9 87.8  89.5 89.9 89.3 88.6 
Consumption taxes, social benefits 
tax not included 
1694 2016 1953 1867 30329 2056 2290 
Percentage of consumption taxes (%, 
social benefits tax not included) 
48.0 46.6 43.4 45.8 47.9 47.8 47.8 
We still have to consider one further aspect. Every uro that is paid into the state budget 
circulates about 2.8 times a year. Based on the assumption that circulation is 2.0 times since negative 
balances are made in the middle of the year, we calculate that the negative state balances have cut the 
state balance income for future periods by at least  0.7  billion euro or 41.8% from their own proporti n.  
It’s clear that the decrease of the incomes from the budget decreased the possibilities of the state 
to support innovative processes. The decrease appeared in two ways: the decrease of direct money from 
state for different RD processes and the decrease of th  support of a certain field of private sector. Both of 
them are difficult to bring forth. 
The part of costs for innovation was first time so-called officially publicized in the statement of 
2010 State Budget draft act. (They weren’t mentioned in the statement of 2009.) The (initial) costs of 
R&D of 2009 have been given there. The total sum isn’t very small – it’s 129 million euro, among that 79
million euro due to foreign support. (Eesti Vabariigi 2010 … http://www.fin.ee/budget/). But 
unfortunately a methodology, which puts all the sum, connected with scientific research, under the 
innovation, has been used to calculate the sum. For example, the total amount of the sums of costs for 
Estonian Foreign Policy Institute as something, which gives some innovation, apparently isn’t reasoned.  
Due to the lack of data it’s practically impossible to answer the question, how much did the costs 
of innovation decrease in a situation, wherein the state budget of 2009 was 11.7% smaller than the one of 
2008 and the stated budget of 2010 further 0.1% smaller than the budget of 2009. Estonian statistics gves 
just the dynamics of the investments: 5,4 billion euro in 2007; 4.7 billion euro in 2008;  3,2 billion euro in 
2009; and  2010 is 2.9 billion euro (Eesti Vabariigi…, 2010, p. 93). Therefore the investments have been 
decreased essentially more than GDP and state budget. If the decrease of investments is more than 45%, 
then it’s obvious that all the investing activity has been impeded. The current system of the budget hasn’t 
assured the sustainability of the innovative processes. 
It is clear that the decrease in the incomes from the budget decreased the capacity of the state to 
support innovative processes. The decrease appeared in two ways: the decrease in direct money from the 
state for different R&D processes, and the decrease in upport from the private sector. Both are difficult 
to quantify. 
Expenditure on innovation was officially publicized for the first time in the statement of the 2010 
State Budget draft act (It was not mentioned in the statement for 2009). The initial costs of R&D in 2009 
were given there. The total sum is substantial – 132 million euro, of that 79 million euro due to foreign 
support (Kaupade jaemüük. Eesti Statistikaamet. http://pub.stat.ee/xp-we; Riigieelarve kassapõhised…., 
2009, p.19-20) unfortunately, the calculation methodol gy put all sums connected with scientific research 
under the heading of innovation. Counting, for example, the total costs for the Estonian Foreign Policy 
Institute as “innovation” is apparently un-challengd.   
Due to the lack of data it is practically impossible to determine how far innovation expenditure 
decreased when the state budget of 2009 was 11.7% smaller than that of 2008, and the stated budget of 
2010 a further 0.1% smaller than the budget of 2009 has been impeded. The current system of the budget 
has not assured the sustainability of the innovation process.  
 
 
2.  CONCLUSIONS 
The following can be concluded from the above: 
In 1993–1999, the influence of the tax system on the development of Estonian society, especially 
on its economic environment, was weak. 
The Estonian tax system was changed in 2000. Since 1 January 2000 corporate profit has not 
been taxable in Estonia. Only the outgoing cash dividends, benefits and other payments are taxable. Th 
purpose of this kind of taxation experiment was to encourage companies to reinvest more in their assets 
and to attract foreign investments. The author was unable to find clear correlations between the lifting of 
corporate income tax and investments on the one hand, d the GDP growth rate and trade balance 
deficiency on the other.  
Such a modest influence on the entrepreneurship environment is explained by a number of 
factors. Comparison of the Estonian taxation system with those of several other Eastern European 
countries demonstrates that in those other countries corporate profits have not been taxed higher thanin 
Estonia. Obviously, Estonia has not reached the desired position in its competition with other transition 
states. Therefore, taxes, at least corporate income tax (or its lifting), have not been among the main 
factors determining the entrepreneurship environment. The systems of several states, where the reinvested 
profit, not all the profit, was left free of income taxation, have proved to be more innovative than 
Estonia’s. 
The structure of the revenues of the Estonian statebudget differs considerably from that of other 
EU Member States. The percentage of environment taxes is negligible, while the peculiarly structured 
social benefits tax, which constitutes the greatest and increasing source of revenue, is difficult to classify 
as either a direct, indirect or labour tax. Due to the huge proportion of consumption taxes the buoyanc  of 
the Estonian tax system is weak.  
The shortfall of income to the state budget in 2008 and especially in 2009 has forced the 
government to make cutbacks of up to 10% and has acutely raised the issue of increasing the tax burden. 
As the tax burden in Estonia is substantially lower than the EU average, this is possible. However, that 
raises the question of the optimal tax burden. Based on Slutsky’s principle of a compensated demand 
curve and Ramsey’s optimal tax theory, we can take the optimal level of indirect taxes (which are 
dominant in Estonia) to be the point where the household welfare reduction curve and the social welfar 
increase curve intersect. 
The way the Estonian Government has chosen to balance the budget – a continuous cut in 
expenses – forms a vicious circle as the cuts, particularly to wages, decrease incomes in the next period. 
According to the most modest calculations, which have not taken into consideration the decrease in 
demand due to macroeconomic influences, the state budget of Estonia lost 7 billion due to these cuts.  
The economic depression, which began in 2008, has demonstrated the weak orientation of the 
Estonian economy and questioned the value of its taxation system for innovation. The amount of 
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